1941, the book

World War II was a defining event of the 20th century and we continue to celebrate pivotal moments of the war.  A friend traveled to Normandy, France last summer with his father to commemorate one:  D-Day.[1] That was the day the democratic empires struck back against Hitler’s totalitarian regime, landing over 150,000 soldiers on the shores of France to begin taking the battle to the Germans from the west in earnest. 

For those who don’t follow these things closely, it happened rather late in the war, in June 1944.[2] Journalist Andrew Nagorski thinks the outcome of the war had long since been determined.  His book 1941 The Year Germany Lost The War makes a compelling case.  Told largely through the eyes of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, who were bearing the brunt of Hitler’s might, the book depicts the conversations, deal-making, and decisions that were to prove decisive.

1941 dawned with Germany ascendant, the lord of Europe, save for Great Britain, which was under constant air assault. Germany was never able to achieve aerial or naval supremacy, and therefore could not invade the home island of the British Empire.  But immunity from tanks did not guarantee that Great Britain would prevail.  It had few fighting allies, just the remnants of various overrun European countries, particularly France and Poland.[3] And it had many other issues to contend with, including attacks by Germany and Italy in Africa, preserving access to oil from the Middle East, and protecting a host of territories around the world.

Then Great Britain got lucky.  Instead of pressing his advantage, Hitler turned on his putative ally, the Soviet Union.  Hitler couched his many territorial depredations in terms of “lebensraum,” meaning “living space.”  The Soviet Union was the mother of living space. In Hitler’s eyes, Germany was great and deserved to have more territory and resources for its great people.  The obvious counterpart is that other people, in particular Slavs, Jews, and gypsies, were weak and disposable, essentially in the way.  

The decision to attack the Soviet Union was not guided by experts, but by Hitler’s gut instincts. A great albatross of autocrats is that they think they know everything and don’t like to take advice, even from those with superior knowledge and experience.  This tendency hurt both Hitler and Stalin.  Hitler refused to believe his economic and logistical experts, who told him that attacking the Soviet Union would lead to a breakdown in resources – because Stalin had been supplying Hitler with a vast store of natural resources as a means of placating him. 

Stalin refused to believe his experts, who told him that Hitler was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. He preferred to continue the placation game to the full extent. Hitler believed that his successes against Poland and France were just a precursor to greater success – without considering how much smaller in territory and fewer in soldiers those countries were than the Soviet Union.  Stalin so believed in his treaty with Hitler that he refused to relocate critical assets or shore up defenses in case (as all his spies warned him) Hitler did attack.[4]  In this, the author states that “Stalin was demonstrating that he was even more delusionary than Hitler.” No small task.   

The German army’s early success led to concerns that it might take Moscow, the heart of historical Russia and modern Soviet Union. That may have ended the war for the Soviets. But stung by his earlier refusal to believe his experts, Stalin heeded intelligence that Japan would not attack Siberia, and transferred 400,000 soldiers from the east to Moscow in time to save the city.

Meanwhile, Winston Churchill was trying hard to convince the United States to commit to the war effort.  It wasn’t easy – there was a vehement group of isolationists in the US, led by Charles Lindbergh and his America First movement.  President Roosevelt had marginal support in Congress to supply Britain and the Soviet Union, but not enough to declare war.  It would take another misguided decision by an autocrat (this time in Japan, against the advice of the senior leader with the most knowledge about the US) to effectuate that decision.

When Japan attacked the US, the stay-out-of-the-war America First crowd suddenly lacked a safe harbor. When Germany supported its ally by declaring war on the US, the US reciprocated, leading three and a half years later to D-Day. Churchill considered these declarations of war against the US the beginning of the end. Ultimately, he was proved right. (I don’t think I’ve spoiled the ending.)

One of the reasons to read history is to avoid repeating the mistakes of others. See Santayana, George. So, while reading, I often think about lessons for our own times; this time, I found at least two.  The tyrants’ disdain for experts disquietingly reminds me of President Trump and the anti-science wing of the Republican party. Churchill’s belief in an inevitable victory is similar to today’s optimistic Democrats as they seek to unseat President Trump. But nothing in history is inevitable (except when viewed in hindsight). Winning WWII was not preordained, and neither is the continued success of our experiment in republican government.  If you like history in general or WWII in particular, you will enjoy this book, which accessible and interesting. It might even give you a few insights into our current crises. 


[1] Kevin Diehl movingly describes his father Harry Diehl’s D-Day experience, including their visit to the 75th anniversary celebration at https://www.neelawfirm.com/post/d-day-75th-anniversary

[2] The war started in 1939 when Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland; the Nazis annexed western Poland and the communists annexed eastern Poland.  The war ended a little over a year after D-Day:  in September 1945.

[3] One American commentator at the time declared that London contained so many governments in exile that it was the capitol of six to eight countries.

[4] One of the great what-ifs of history is what if Hitler had not attacked the Soviets Union, but instead had redoubled his attacks on Great Britain, taken the island, and stood down.  He would have controlled the vast majority of Europe and been essentially at peace, with a continued flow of resources from the Soviet Union. It is possible that the European Union would be called “Germany” to this day.

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.